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ABSTRACT 
What are you purchasing when you buy a print of Picasso’s Guernica?  The 
piece of paper it is printed on, several courts have replied.  In these instances, 
courts have created a pragmatic legal fiction that allows for the transfer of a copy 
of a work while the author retains his or her rights and privileges under copyright 
law.  Therefore, the purchaser of the Guernica print could resell his or her legally 
created print of the painting on the secondary market.  This is the essence of the 
First Sale Doctrine of the U.S. Copyright Act.  This practice breaks down, howev-
er, when applied to copies of intellectual property that consist of pure data, as is 
the case with software purchased through digital distribution platforms.  Through 
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these platforms, software is downloaded from the internet and there is nothing to 
symbolize a transfer of physical property ownership as there is in the sale of a print 
of a painting.  This lack of a tangible medium has allowed publishers to character-
ize the transfer of pure data as a license rather than a sale of property.  Publishers 
can use these licenses to strip property rights from consumers, such as the right of 
resale under the First Sale Doctrine.  This practice insulates the software publisher 
from losses to the resale market to the detriment of consumers who would benefit 
from purchasing used software for a discounted price.  In the continuing transition 
to a digital world where a great deal of business is done in pure data, rights could 
easily be stripped from a purchaser’s property interests that would be fully pro-
tected in a more traditional medium.  It is important that courts recognize a proper-
ty right in this data to protect the rights of consumers during this transition.  The 
First Sale Doctrine must be applied to all software transactions—not just those 
conducted through physical media such as compact disks and DVD’s—so that all 
transactions are treated equally.  Publishers should not be able to take rights away 
from consumers simply by conducting business through a popular new medium 
that is purely digital. 
Until recently, a trend was developing across several circuits that favored a 
digital First Sale Doctrine for software.  In September 2010, the Ninth Circuit dealt 
a serious blow to this movement when it issued its decision in Vernor v. Autodesk, 
Inc.  This decision calls for a strict constructionist approach to the interpretation of 
software licensing agreements.  A right of resale that would be protected under the 
First Sale Doctrine in a different medium, such as paper, is no longer protected un-
der this precedent, as this right can be eliminated through the use of a licensing 
contract.  This circuit split comes at a time when an increasing amount of software 
transactions are conducted via digital distribution.  Software purchasers are uncer-
tain of their rights in this new medium, and discussion of the ownership privileges 
that consumers have in downloaded software has become a subject of public 
speculation with no certain answer at the present time.  Popular concern and differ-
ing judicial approaches converge in this topic, resulting in a scenario that is certain 
to reach courts with increasing frequency over the coming years. 
This Comment stretches beyond the world of legal scholarship and explores 
a topic that is receiving mainstream attention.  The legal community will benefit 
from the simple summary of the evolving state of the First Sale Doctrine contained 
herein.  Furthermore, this explanation will prove helpful for mainstream media re-
porters, bloggers, lobbyists, publishers, consumers, or anyone else seeking back-
ground information and solutions to make for a more informed public discussion of 
the rights that consumers and publishers have in downloaded software. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What are you purchasing when you purchase a print of Picasso’s Guernica? 
The piece of paper it is printed on, several courts have replied.1  In this instance, 
                                                          
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, Michigan State University College of Law. The author would like to 
thank Professor Nancy Costello for her valuable suggestions and guidance. 
1 See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the various ways that courts have treated transactions 
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courts have created a pragmatic legal fiction that allows for a transfer of a copy of 
a work while the author retains his or her rights and privileges under copyright 
law.2  The fiction breaks down, however, when applied to copies of intellectual 
property that consist of pure data.3  Software purchased through digital distribution 
platforms, consists of nothing but data.4  There is no medium attached and nothing 
to symbolize a transfer of physical property ownership.5  This lack of a tangible 
medium has allowed publishers and courts to consider a transfer of pure data as a 
reason for characterizing such a transaction as a licensing agreement rather than a 
sale of property.6  These licenses allow publishers to strip property rights from 
consumers, and perhaps, most importantly, a right of resale under the First Sale 
Doctrine.7  This forced license insulates the producer from losses to the resale 
market—sales that the publishers are not able to profit from—to the detriment of 
consumers who would benefit from purchasing used software for a discounted 
price.8   
This licensing approach is problematic in light of the continuing transition to 
a digital world where a great deal of business is done in pure data and rights can 
easily be stripped from property interests that would be fully protected in a more 
traditional medium.9  It is important that courts recognize a property right in this 
data to protect the rights of consumers during this transition, even if this protection 
                                                          
involving software). 
2 See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the various ways that courts have treated software li-
censing agreements).  Under copyright law: 
[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any 
of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual im-
ages of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display copyrighted work 
publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
3 See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing the problems in adapting the First Sale Doctrine to purely 
digital media). 
4 See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the mechanics of software sales through digital distribu-
tion platforms). 
5 See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the characteristics of digital software distribution). 
6 See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing software publishers’ use of licensing agreements to cha-
racterize transactions involving software as licenses). 
7 See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the ways that software publishers utilize licensing 
agreements to shift property rights from the consumer to the publisher). 
8 See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the economics of software resale and the benefits to 
consumers that result from a secondary market). 
9 See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the properties of digital software distribution transac-
tions and the problems posed by the lack of a physical medium for a transaction). 
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causes minor losses to the publishers.10  The First Sale Doctrine must be applied to 
all software transactions—not just those conducted through physical media such as 
compact discs and DVDs—so that all transactions are treated equally.  Publishers 
should not be able to take rights away from consumers only by conducting busi-
ness through a popular new medium.11  Digital media should be subject to the 
same standards and traditions that have developed around traditional media that 
largely contains identical information in a different format.12 
A change in legal analysis that would protect a consumer’s rights in a digital 
copy would represent a return to the bedrock principles of the First Sale Doc-
trine.13  The motive behind the creation of the First Sale Doctrine is that copyright 
creators should not be able to control the resale of a copy of an item of intellectual 
property after it is out of the copyright holder’s hands.14  The use of licensing 
agreements in software sales attempts to eviscerate this principle.15  In the past, 
courts have held that the transfer of the physical property that contains the copy of 
intellectual property signifies a transfer of ownership of the property.16  When ap-
plied to software being sold through digital means, this analysis would bring about 
interesting results, and does not reflect the value of the item seen by the consum-
er.17  The consumer purchases a Picasso print for the art itself, not for the paper it 
is put upon, or in the software context, the consumer purchases the data or soft-
ware, as opposed to the media it is transferred upon.   
The application of the First Sale Doctrine will require active steps by Con-
gress to overcome the negative incentives that software publishers have to keep 
these measures from being installed.18  The software that is being sold is more im-
portant than the media upon which it is transferred; therefore, different modes of 
                                                          
10 See discussion infra Part V (analyzing the incentives to publishers to provide mechanisms for 
digital software distribution). 
11 See discussion infra Part III (discussing the shifting of rights that the First Sale Doctrine entails). 
12 See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the various ways that courts have treated software li-
censing agreements). 
13 See discussion infra Part II (analyzing the origins and policy rationale of the First Sale Doc-
trine). 
14 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908). The Court grounded this policy 
stance in its view of the goals of the copyright statutes of the time, stating: 
In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in 
his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by 
notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be 
sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract. This 
conclusion is reached in view of the language of the statute, read in the light of its 
main purpose to secure the right of multiplying copies of the work, a right which 
is the special creation of the statute. 
Id. 
15 See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.A (discussing the use of licensing agreements to change the 
distribution of property rights between publisher and purchaser). 
16 See, e.g., SoftMan Products Co. v.  Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 
2001) (describing the process of looking to the “economic realities of the exchange” to determine the 
true nature of a transaction). 
17 See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing the application of traditional First Sale Doctrine prin-
ciples to digital media). 
18 See discussion infra Part V.B (discussing the possible use of legislation to enforce a digital First 
Sale Doctrine). 
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transfer should not be treated differently.19  Prospective resellers would benefit by 
being able to recognize an economic benefit through the sale of the used software, 
and buyers on the secondary market would also receive a substantial economic 
benefit from being able to purchase software that would otherwise be unafforda-
ble.20  Courts should break free from terminology and apply the “Duck Test:” if a 
transaction looks like a sale and quacks like a sale, it is probably a sale and it 
should be treated as such, with all of the property rights that a full transfer of own-
ership entails.21 
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of the First Sale Doctrine 
generally, the history of characterizations of transactions involving software as li-
censes, and recent cases addressing the transfer of software.  Part III analyzes the 
substance of software distributed through hard copies and through digital methods, 
and argues that the products are essentially the same, and therefore the First Sale 
Doctrine should apply equally in both mediums.  Part IV discusses methods that 
would be required in applying the First Sale Doctrine to the sale of software digi-
tally, such as the forward and delete, and centralized license management methods.  
Finally, Part V discusses the incentives that software distributors have to keep 
these measures from being applied to their software, and advocates for the use of 
legislation to force compliance with a digital First Sale Doctrine. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
The First Sale Doctrine has evolved over time to accommodate new devel-
opments in the swiftly changing media landscape.  The doctrine has persevered de-
spite technological advancement due to the willingness of courts to preserve the 
values at the core of its establishment.  Courts should continue to respect the pro-
tection of these values when determining how to cope with the challenges pre-
sented by digital distribution platforms. 
A.  Early Foundations 
The First Sale Doctrine was born in the 1908 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Bobbs-Merrill Co.  v. Straus.22  The Court reasoned that though the copyright sta-
tutes create a number of rights regarding the reproduction of a piece of intellectual 
property, these rights do not include the ability to restrict future resale of a copy.23  
This interpretation was based on a strict constructionist view of the copyright sta-
                                                          
19 See discussion infra Part II.C (comparing the properties of software sold on traditional media 
and software sold via digital distribution). 
20 See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the economic benefits provided by the First Sale Doc-
trine). 
21 The term, “Duck Test,” was coined by poet James Whitcomb Riley. ROBIN S. DAVIS, WHO’S 
SITTING ON YOUR NEST EGG?: WHY YOU NEED A FINANCIAL ADVISOR AND TEN EASY TESTS FOR 
FINDING THE BEST ONE 7 (2007).  It is used as a simplistic analytical tool to determine the identity of 
something by observing its characteristics.  Id. 
22 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341–43 (1908) (involving the resale of a book that 
had a licensing agreement affixed to the inside of its cover that included terms prohibiting resale). 
23 Id. at 350–51.  The Court stressed that the primary right created under the statute is “an exclu-
sive right to the multiplication of the copies.”  Id. at 347. 
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tutes of the time, and clarified that though the copyright statutes grant the copy-
right owner the exclusive right to reproduce and sell new copies of the work, the 
statute does not give the copyright owner the ability to control the sale of those 
copies once they are out of the copyright owner’s hands.24  The Court also recog-
nized longstanding principles of property law disfavoring restrictions on alienation 
of property.25  Property is one of the fundamental rights protected by the United 
States Constitution and, therefore, protecting the rights associated with the copies 
of intellectual property purchased by consumers was a critical consideration in the 
decision.26  Furthermore, the Court stated that it strongly  disfavors the use of a li-
censing agreement to control the resale of a book once the copy is out of the hands 
of the author.27 
Congress later codified the essence of the Bobbs-Merrill Co. holding, requir-
ing that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under[17 
U.S.C. § 109(a)], or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord.”28  The statute is limited in scope, it utilizes the word 
“owner,” limiting its protection to only those consumers who actually own the 
copy they wish to resell.29  The statute does not explicitly extend its protection to 
licensees.30 
Ninety years after Bobbs-Merrill was decided, the Supreme Court included a 
powerful line of dicta in the 1998 case of Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza 
Research International, Inc., that provided an exception to the First Sale Doctrine 
if the reseller is not a true owner of a copy and allowed for publishers to restrict 
important property rights through the use of licensing agreements.31  This opinion 
                                                          
24 Id.  The Court viewed the creator of a copyrighted work as having two different sets of rights 
that can never coexist.  Id. at 346–47.  The first is a set of common law property rights to control one’s 
own property.  Id. at 346.  The second is the set of rights that arise under copyright law when the work 
is published.  Id. at 347.  This second set overrides the first, and is one of the reasons that the copyright 
creator has no controlling interest in the property upon publication.  Id. 
25 Id. at 349–50. The Court recognized that the author relinquishes control of the copy after sale, 
stating: 
What does the statute mean in granting “the sole right of vending the same?”  
Was it intended to create a right which would permit the holder of the copyright 
to fasten, by notice in a book or upon one of the articles mentioned within the sta-
tute, a restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of copy-
right after the owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired full domi-
nion over it and had given a satisfactory price for it? It is not denied that one who 
has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to con-
trol the sale of it.  The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner 
of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of 
it. 
Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See id.   
28 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 2011). 
29 Id. 
30 See id. 
31 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146–47 (1998) 
(“[B]ecause the protection afforded by [the First Sale Doctrine] is available only to the ‘owner’ of a 
lawfully made copy (or someone authorized by the owner), the first sale doctrine would not provide a 
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explicitly allowed for the use of a licensing agreement that could limit resale of a 
copy.32  By emphasizing that the First Sale Doctrine only applies to an owner of a 
copy, as opposed to a licensee, the Court left open the possibility of a license being 
used to re-characterize a transaction that would otherwise be a sale.33  The case did 
not deal with a licensing agreement, however, so the proposition in the dicta was 
left vague and undefined.34   
Courts generally look to the clarity of a licensing agreement to determine 
whether a contract eviscerates the First Sale Doctrine.35  When a contract is un-
clear, the doctrine is generally held to apply.36  When the terms are clear, however, 
the First Sale Doctrine can be eliminated in the contract.37  For example, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that a license restricting the resale of film reels was valid because 
resale was explicitly prohibited under the terms of a valid licensing agreement.38  
In contrast, the Southern District of Texas has declined to eliminate the First Sale 
Doctrine from a transaction because the terms of the licensing agreement were not 
explicit as to a restraint on resale and rental.39  These early cases laid the backdrop 
against which the important problems involving software unfold. 
B.  Sale v. License: Problems Defining the Nature of Transactions Involving 
Software 
Publishers began attaching a license to their software at sale in an attempt to 
                                                          
defense to a [copyright infringement] action against any nonowner such as a bailee, licensee, a cosig-
nee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful.”). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See generally id.  For example, in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., the Ninth Circuit cited this line of 
dicta before going on to hold that a license agreement is valid and can remove First Sale Doctrine rights 
from the consumer.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
No. 10-1421, 2011 WL 4530222 (Oct. 3, 2011). 
35 Judith Klerman Smith, The Computer Software Rental Act: Amending the “First Sale Doctrine” 
to Protect Computer Software Copyright, 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1613, 1631–32 (1987). 
36 Id. at 1632.  
37 Id. 
38 See generally United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977) (involving a case of criminal 
copyright infringement stemming from the resale of film governed by a licensing agreement).  In Wise, 
the court analyzed the substance of the transaction to determine the true nature of the transaction, rather 
than just analyzing the plain language.  Id. at 1191.  This was accomplished by looking at the appear-
ance of the transaction, rather than the label applied to the transaction by the publisher.  Id.  The court 
concluded that there was no first sale due to the presence of a valid licensing agreement that had the 
characteristics of a licensing agreement rather than a sale, and therefore, the party attempting to sell the 
copies was not within his rights.  Id. at 1193–94.  The license at issue in the case reads: 
The Distributor grants the Exhibitor and the Exhibitor accepts a limited license 
under the respective copyrights of the motion picture . . . to exhibit said motion 
picture.  
. . . . 
Title to all prints and tapes shall be and remain in Licensor (Warner) subject to 
the rights granted to NBC under this agreement. 
Id. at 1190–91. 
39 See generally United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (involving the copying 
of aerial geographical survey maps).  The court held that there is a presumption favoring ownership 
unless a licensing agreement explicitly removes that right and associated rights.  Id. at 635–36. 
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restrict hackers from copying the underlying code of a program and as a way of 
maintaining trade secret protection of the software.40  These agreements quickly 
evolved to include other terms, such as restrictions on resale, rental, and reitera-
tions of the copyright owners’ rights that prevent holders of copies from duplicat-
ing their own copies.41  Licenses originally came inside of the cellophane wrap-
ping that the software was contained in, and the agreement could not be read until 
after the item had been purchased and opened, hence the term “shrinkwrap” 
agreement.42  The contracts later moved into the software itself, often becoming a 
part of an installation program where the user would need to click “I agree” after 
scrolling through an agreement.43  The licenses are now commonly referred to as 
“keywrap,” “clickwrap,” or “click-on” agreements due to the modern form that 
they typically take.44   
Courts are split as to whether these licensing agreements can bind users of 
software after a sale.  Some courts have looked no further than the substance of the 
sale in deciding that the transfer of software is a sale.45  The approach taken in 
these opinions—sometimes simply referred to as the “SoftMan approach” for the 
case it originated in—has been to consider the media that the software is sold on,46 
rather than the software itself, as the item that is being sold.47  This approach ig-
nores the contents of the disc and any click-wrap agreement that may be contained 
as a part of it, and looks at the “economic realities of the exchange.”48  The trans-
fer that occurs is viewed as a transfer of goods, and therefore, the restrictions con-
                                                          
40 David A.  Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act First 
Sale Doctrine, 30 Jurimetrics J. 157, 159 (1990).  It is unknown when exactly software licenses first 
entered usage amongst publishers, but they became common during the 1980s.  Mark A.  Lemley, Intel-
lectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1241 n.5 (1995). 
41 Rice, supra note 40, at 159–62. 
42 Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1025, 1055–56 (1998). 
43 Id. at 1058. 
44 Id.  Whether or not these agreements are binding as a general matter is debatable due to issues of 
adhesion, but these problems are beyond the scope of this Comment.  See generally Batya Goodman, 
Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 
Cardozo L. Rev. 319 (1999).  Results have been mixed when courts have been confronted with shrink-
wrap agreements, but the majority rule seems to be that they are invalid. Lemley, supra note 40, at 
1249–50.  There are three reasons that these agreements can be held to be invalid: 1) Merger under Uni-
form Commercial Code § 2-207 does not allow for the inclusion of the new terms in the contract after 
sale; 2) terms in the contract, especially those that restrict common property rights, are likely to be held 
unconscionable; and 3) copyright law preempts these new contractual terms.  Id. at 1248–59. 
45 See, e.g., In re DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a transaction 
involving computer software was a sale, and therefore, the software could be re-sold to finance bank-
ruptcy proceedings); Downriver Internists v. Harris Corp., 929 F.2d 1147, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding 
that the sale of software to a hospital was a sale of goods, as opposed to services); SoftMan Products 
Co. v.  Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that the sale of a bundle 
of software to a distributor is a sale, not a license, due to the transfer of physical copies of the software). 
46 This physical medium is typically a compact disc or DVD. 
47 SoftMan Products Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (involving the unauthorized distribution of bun-
dled software). 
48 Id.  The economic realities of an exchange can consist of any part of an exchange, down to the 
wording.  Id.  The court held that because a payment was called a royalty rather than a licensing fee, 
that the transaction in question was a sale.  SoftMan Products Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (citing Mi-
crosoft Corp. v. DAK Indus., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
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tained within the agreements are invalid.49  The SoftMan court indicated that the 
term of the license can also be a factor in whether a license will be controlling.50  
If the license expires and the user must return the software or renew the license, the 
transfer is more in line with the realities of a license agreement.51  In this case, the 
license is more likely to govern the transfer and the buyer has no right to resell the 
software.52 
The Third Circuit has taken this a step further by applying the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in a way that bars the removal of the First Sale Doc-
trine from a transaction.53  In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 
the court used the U.C.C. to omit a shrink-wrap agreement from the terms of a 
transfer.54  The court viewed this as a two-step process because the software was 
purchased at a store, then taken home and opened before the shrink-wrap agree-
ment was discovered.55  The initial agreement is forged at the initial purchase of 
the software.56  When the shrink-wrap agreement is found, new terms are incorpo-
rated or omitted as governed by the U.C.C.57  The court held that because the sub-
ject provisions materially altered the initial agreement without a bargained agree-
ment between the two parties, the new terms were not brought in as terms of the 
transfer and the shrink-wrap license was effectively removed from the transac-
tion.58 
The Seventh Circuit has also used the U.C.C. to analyze whether a license 
agreement governs the sale of software, but arrived at a different result.59  In 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the court used U.C.C. principles to arrive at the conclu-
sion that the retention of software after discovery of a shrink-wrap agreement is 
conduct that can be treated as an acceptance.60  Under this analysis, the shrink-
wrap agreement functions as a new offer that can only be rejected by returning the 
software to where it was purchased.61  Retaining the software effectively acts as an 
acceptance of the licensing agreement on the part of the purchaser, and the court 
recognized the license that governed the transaction in this case.62  This case illu-
strated a willingness on the part of the court to make inferences about the consum-
                                                          
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1085.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See generally, Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (involving 
the validity of a shrink-wrap license attached to the inside of a software box).  Under U.C.C. § 2-201, 
“an additional term . . . will not be incorporated into the parties’ contract if the term’s addition to the 
contract would materially alter the parties’ agreement.”  Id. at 105. 
54 Id. at 100–04.  Specifically, the court applied § 2-207 to determine which new terms under the 
licensing agreement would become a part of the contract governing the transaction. Id. at 100. 
55 Id. at 100–04. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving the resale of in-
formation contained in a phone directory sold on a compact disc). 
60 Id. at 1452.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1452–53.  
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er’s preferences based on whether the consumer returned the software, but left 
such inferences out of the initial bargaining process.63 
A recent Ninth Circuit case, Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., explicitly addressed 
the First Sale Doctrine and declined to recognize that the doctrine applies to soft-
ware governed by a licensing agreement.64  Prior to reaching the Ninth Circuit, the 
Western District of Washington cited SoftMan and held that a licensing contract 
could not remove the First Sale Doctrine from the terms of the transaction because 
the transfer substantially appeared to be a sale.65  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the decision.66  The court of appeals used a strict constructionist approach 
to interpret the licensing agreement and honored it because the parties had essen-
tially assented to the licensing agreement and, therefore, had assented to the elimi-
nation of the right of resale.67  The SoftMan approach of analyzing the substance of 
the licensing contract was ignored, and the court took an approach that strictly ad-
hered to the explicit terms of the contract.68  An importance was placed on the ac-
tual terms of the contract, as opposed to an inference drawn by the court as to what 
the agreement should have been according to its substance, as was the case in 
SoftMan.69  Vernor is one of the latest decisions involving licensing and software, 
and the court’s departure from majority precedent represents a significant devel-
opment due to the Ninth Circuit’s prominence in the area of media law and the 
presence of important media producers on the West Coast, specifically of the mul-
timedia mecca that is Silicon Valley.70   
C.  The Emergence of Digital Distribution 
Digital distribution is the practice of distributing files or software over the in-
ternet without the use of disks or other hard copies.71  The method began primarily 
                                                          
63 See id. 
64 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (involving the resale of Auto-
CAD software by a private consumer). 
65 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2009), 
vacated, 621 F.3d 1102  (9th Cir. 2010). 
66 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1116. 
67 Id. (“We hold that because CTA is a licensee, not an owner, the ‘sale’ of its Release 14 copies to 
Vernor did not convey ownership.”). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 For a list of companies with a significant presence in Silicon Valley, see Silicon Valley Compa-
nies, THE SILICON VALLEY GATEWAY, http://www.siliconvalley-usa.com/companie/ (last visited Nov. 
6, 2011). 
71 See The Evolution of Digital Distribution: About Impulse, GAMESTOP, 
http://www.impulsedriven.com/about (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter About Impulse].  Stardock 
sold Impulse to GameStop in the Spring of 2011. Kyle Orland, Stardock Bringing Games to Steam Fol-
lowing Impulse Sale, GAMASUTRA (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/ 
38604/Stardock_Bringing_Games_To_Steam_Following_Impulse_Sale.php. Stardock, the company 
behind creating Impulse, has embraced digital software distribution fully, and is very open about their 
practices.  Stardock’s documentation and publicity regarding Impulse is a vital source of information on 
the subject, and is relied on heavily throughout this Note as other companies are not as forthcoming 
about their motivations and practices. 
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with the distribution of simple music files through services such as iTunes. 72  
Software later became available through services such as Steam and Impulse and 
other large publishers as the distribution methods became more advanced.73  Busi-
ness is conducted entirely over the internet, through programs called digital distri-
bution platforms that serve as a means of downloading and installing the software 
that is purchased.74  Software purchases are tied to a user account so that when a 
purchase is made, the account is authorized to download the software.75  Once the 
software is downloaded and installed, it performs identically to software purchased 
through a traditional storefront, and is identical in function to a traditional hard 
disk copy.76 
Publishers often use copy protection on software to protect software from pi-
racy.77  When software is sold via a digital distribution platform, the software is 
effectively linked to the users account, which is a form of copy protection in and of 
itself.78  Only the owner can get updates to the software that may be released on 
the digital distribution platform and directly download the software from the pub-
lisher’s servers.79  Both of these measures can serve as a deterrent to piracy, as 
critical updates are often distributed after the release of the main piece of software 
that can be highly desirable.80  Potential pirates would either be required to down-
load the software legitimately themselves to get the copy that they distribute, or to 
find a legitimate buyer who is willing to get his or copy duplicated.81  Some pub-
lishers take this a step further, requiring the owning user to be signed into a host 
server that houses the software.82  Though no transactions may be occurring during 
this time, this prevents users who are not true owners from using the software.83  
                                                          
72 Cabel Sasser, The True Story of Audion, PANIC, INC., http://panic.com/extras/audionstory/ (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2011).  iTunes, founded in 2001, was the first major and viable online digital distribu-
tion platform for music.  Id. 
73 Steam and Impulse are software programs that facilitate the downloading of other programs over 
the internet.  See, e.g., About Impulse, supra note 71; Steam, the Ultimate Online Game Platform, 
STEAM, http://store.steampowered.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
74 See, e.g., About Impulse, supra note 71. 
75 See, e.g., Can I Give My Copy of Software to a Friend?, STARDOCK SUPPORT CENTER, 
http://esupport.stardock.com/index.php?_m=knowledgebase&_a=viewarticle&kbarticleid=353 (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2011) (stating that “[Stardock’s] software is single-user and non-transferable.”). 
76 In some cases, retail disk versions of software are recognized and compatible with a digital dis-
tribution platform because the versions are identical. See, e.g., Retail CD Keys, STEAM SUPPORT, 
https://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=7480-wusf-3601 (last visited Dec. 3, 2011) (list-
ing games where a serial key from a retail disk can be entered into Steam to allow a digital version of 
the software to be downloaded). 
77 See Brad Wardell on Spore DRM and the Gamer’s Bill of Rights, 1UP.COM (Sept. 23, 2008), 
http://www.1up.com/news/brad-wardell-spore-drm-gamer [hereinafter Wardell Interview]. 
78 See, e.g., Can I Give My Copy of Software to a Friend?, supra note 75. 
79 See, e.g., About Impulse, supra note 71. 
80 Wardell Interview, supra note 77. 
81 Id. 
82 Steam is an example of a service that uses digital rights management to authenticate software 
purchased through its service. Dave Spohn, Using Steam to Download and Play Games, ABOUT.COM 
(Jan. 29, 2010), http://internetgames.about.com/od/tweaks/a/steamprofile.htm. When a game is pur-
chased, it is registered on Steam’s servers.  Id.  The Steam client authenticates downloaded software 
each time the software is launched. Id. 
83 See Impulse Support Sales F.A.Q., GAMESTOP, http://www.impulsedriven.com/support/sales-faq 
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This method totally locks out pirates, but unfortunately both of these systems also 
lock out the secondary market; licenses in these software purchases are not typical-
ly transferable, and therefore, a prospective seller would not be able to transfer 
ownership of the software to a buyer.84 
It is unclear how courts will deal with digital distribution when it is impli-
cated in a lawsuit.85  Amazon’s Kindle utilizes extensive licensing agreements in 
an attempt to control electronic books sold through its service after sale.86  One of 
the terms of the agreement involved in the Kindle service disallows resale of the 
books purchased, which is made simple for Amazon because the Kindle is a closed 
device and system with little possibility for user modification.87  Amazon has total 
control of the devices and the books sold through them.88  Though these agree-
ments have not reached a court yet, it is unknown how the court will treat the terms 
that strip many of the rights that you were to have if you bought the paper copy of 
the book at a similar price.89 
III.  APPLYING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL SOFTWARE SALES 
To shift the focus from the medium through which an item is transferred to 
the value of the item itself—that is, the incorporated data or program—courts must 
recognize a property right in this data.  Recognition of such a property right would 
then permit courts to employ traditional property law principals, which disfavor 
restraints on alienability, thus protecting data transfers from such restraints.90  Im-
plementation of the First Sale Doctrine in the realm of digital software distribution 
would be a benefit to both prospective buyers and sellers on a theoretical second-
ary market.  The U.S. Supreme Court and Congress created the First Sale Doctrine 
generally recognizing a benefit in allowing consumers to resell their legally created 
                                                          
(Last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
84 Digital distribution publishers, to this point, have not given users the tools to transfer licenses, 
leaving the consumer unable to transfer the software that they have purchased to other users. See, e.g., 
Create an Account, STEAM, https://store.steampowered.com/join/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2011) (indicating 
that under Steam’s Subscriber Agreement, “you are not entitled to: (i) sell, grant a security interest in or 
transfer reproductions of the Software to other parties in any way, nor to rent, lease or license the Soft-
ware to others without the prior written consent of Valve.”); Can I Give My Copy of Software to a 
Friend?, Supra note 75 (stating that “[Stardock’s] software is single-user and non-transferable.”). 
85 See, e.g., Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the Copy Ownership 
Debate, 12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 147, 197–98 (2010).  The Kindle is a small computer device designed for 
reading electronic copies of books.  Id.  Though Seringhaus uses the Amazon Kindle as the subject of 
his article, the principle governing the sale of the Kindle and software over its respective digital distri-
bution platforms are similar.  Seringhaus suggests that whether the First Sale Doctrine will apply to 
Kindle books is a function of whether the courts chose to follow SoftMan, or a strict constructionist ap-
proach that respects the licensing agreement similarly to Vernor.  Id.  See SoftMan Products Co. v.  
Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 
1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). 
86 Seringhaus, supra note 85, at 197. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
90 Recognizing such a property right would keep the law governing digitally distributed software 
consistent with general First Sale Doctrine and property law principals.  See discussion supra Part II.A 
(discussion Bobbs-Merrill Co. and the property law considerations behind the First Sale Doctrine). 
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copies of intellectual property on an open secondary market.91  To determine 
whether the First Sale Doctrine would have the same societal benefit in the context 
of digital software distribution as it does generally, two questions must be asked: 
(1) Is there a secondary market for used software? (2) Is it the label of a transac-
tion, or the substance of a transaction that is more important in determining wheth-
er important property rights can be stripped upon the transfer of a copy of intellec-
tual property? 
A.  Is There a Secondary Market for Used Software? 
The first inquiry asks whether there is a secondary market at all.  If there is 
not a viable secondary market, a First Sale Doctrine would have little purpose.92  
This is not the case in the software market, where there would be a benefit to a sig-
nificant amount of consumers.  One example of the existence of a secondary mar-
ket can be found in the used video game market.93  Games make up a significant 
portion of the digital software distribution market, perhaps a majority.94  There are 
entire computer platforms dedicated primarily to games, such as Steam and Im-
pulse.95  Furthermore, games and content are available digitally on gaming con-
soles produced by Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo.96  None of the platforms, nei-
ther on the PC nor on the gaming consoles, contain a method for reselling content 
that is downloaded or merely transferring it to another user.  In stark contrast how-
ever, resale of hard copy games is not only legal, but also is a multi-million dollar 
industry.97  Retail outlets make a significant profit off of buying used copies of 
games and reselling them at a discount.98  A significant number of consumers pur-
                                                          
91 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing Bobbs-Merrill Co. and 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) and 
the policy choices that the Supreme Court and Congress made in setting up the First Sale Doctrine). 
92 Costs would be imposed upon publishers and government to arrive at a solution that no consum-
ers would take advantage of. 
93 See The Used Video Games Market, JJGAMES.COM, http://www.jjgames.com/page/used-games-
infographic (last visited Dec. 2, 2011) (noting that used game and console sales approached $2.5 billion 
in 2009); Kris Graft, Stardock Reveals Impulse, Steam Market Share Estimates, GAMASUTRA (Nov. 19, 
2009), http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/news_index.php?story=26158 (discussing the estimated 
market shares of digital distribution platforms). 
94 Steam, the most widely used digital distribution platform, does not release any sales statistics, 
but Stardock CEO Brad Wardell estimates that Steam controls seventy percent of the digital distribution 
market, while Stardock’s Impulse has captured ten percent.  Graft, supra note 93. Together, these com-
panies represent eighty percent of the market, and the two companies manage this primarily through 
game sales as opposed to more utilitarian software. 
95 Steam and Impulse allow games to be downloaded at or around their standard retail prices, rang-
ing anywhere from approximately ten to fifty dollars depending on the age of the game.  See, e.g., 
About Impulse, supra note 71.  The game is downloaded and installed to one’s computer, where it can 
then be accessed just as a copy of the same program stored on traditional media would be.  Id. 
96 These three companies distribute software through their proprietary services tied to their gaming 
consoles.  Xbox Marketplace, XBOX, http://marketplace.xbox.com/en-US/?xr=shellnav (last visited Jan. 
18, 2011); PLAYSTATION STORE, http://us.playstation.com/psn/playstation-store/index.htm (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2011); Wii Virtual Console, NITENDO, http://www.nintendo.com/wii/online/virtualconsole 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
97 See Kyle Orland, Gamestop’s Used Game Sales Data in Beautiful Chart Form, JOYSTIQ, 
http://www.joystiq.com/2008/02/05/gamestops-used-game-sales-data-in-beautiful-chart-form/ (last vi-
sited Jan 18, 2011). 
98 A typical discount is approximately twenty percent of the retail value of the game.  See, e.g., 
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chase these discounted games—one retailer, GameStop, had over $600 million in 
sales on the used software market in 2007.99  These sales illustrate that there would 
most likely be a similar market for the same software in its digitally distributed 
form.  This data not only suggests that there are consumers willing and ready to 
purchase the software, but also a market demand for the sale of software.  Con-
sumers who are finished with the software will want to sell it and realize an eco-
nomic benefit just as they would if they had a hard copy on a disk.  Such a sale 
would provide a benefit to a secondary market purchaser who desires the software 
but would not otherwise be able to purchase it. An implemented First Sale Doc-
trine would allow each side of the equation to benefit in a more free market. 
In addition to the gaming market, it is easy to imagine that there is a signifi-
cant number of consumers who cannot afford to purchase more utilitarian software 
that would partake of a secondary market.  Consumers who are looking to save 
money or who cannot afford the high prices that office software such as Microsoft 
Office or Adobe products are sold for, may not want to pay a high price for the 
content that would assist them in operating their business.100  However, these same 
consumers might be willing to pay for the software at a discounted price on the 
secondary market.  Such a purchase would provide a benefit for the secondary 
market purchaser who desires the software but would not otherwise be able to pur-
chase the software because of the benefit that would be brought to the person or 
business.   
The seller on the secondary market also benefits in the form of a return on 
the initial investment, even though this may be at a significant discount due to ag-
ing of the software.  Discounts on resold software would be a boon to small busi-
ness owners and students who are unable to afford the software at its full market 
value, but could utilize the software in their day-to-day activities.  Opening up a 
secondary market for digitally distributed software would provide a benefit to a 
variety of consumers whether the software is utilitarian in nature or for leisure pur-
poses.  For example, such a market would allow a small business owner to pur-
chase an old version of software at a discounted price from a larger corporation 
that does not need it anymore, and in turn allow a college student to buy the small 
business’s outdated version.  More consumers would be able to access productivi-
ty-enhancing software in the business context, allowing for a positive impact on 
the economy as a whole. 
                                                          
Halo Reach, GAMESTOP, http://www.gamestop.com/xbox-360/games/halo-reach/75976 (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2011) (displaying and comparing the prices for the new and pre-owned popular video game 
“Halo Reach”). 
99 GameStop has seen its sales of used software grow 444% between 2003 and 2007.  Orland, su-
pra note 97.  Furthermore, approximately 53% of GameStop’s sales are in used games, indicating that 
perhaps used games have a greater value than new games to the majority of shoppers at GameStop.  Id. 
100 Prices on this type of software can reach up to $2,500.  See, e.g., Adobe Creative Suite Family, 
ADOBE,  http://www.adobe.com/products/creativesuite.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  A discount in 
line with the above statistics from the video game market could represent a savings of up to $500 for 
some consumers. 
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B.  Label v. Content: Which Is More Important? 
The second inquiry is whether the label is more important than the content of 
a transaction.  Retail software is almost always accompanied by a licensing agree-
ment when it is purchased.  Courts should look beyond the text of these agree-
ments and look to the realities of a transaction to determine the true nature of the 
transaction.101  When software is transferred, whether by hard copy or digital dis-
tribution, it typically changes hands permanently.102  If the software is not returned 
to the publisher after a fixed period of time, as is the case with almost all software 
purchases, the transaction represents a purchase rather than a license or a rental.103  
Additionally, the hesitancy of courts to honor these licenses, as in Softman and 
Vernor, illustrates that some courts are already skeptical of the status of these 
agreements.104  Because a substantial market would be opened up by the enforce-
ment of a digital First Sale Doctrine, and because the transaction already substan-
tially resembles a sale, the First Sale Doctrine should be implemented for digitally 
distributed software. 
To make for a clearer First Sale Doctrine that governs software, it is neces-
sary that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernor is quickly overturned either by sta-
tute or by case law and that courts use an approach more akin to SoftMan for ana-
lyzing software transactions.105  Reaching all the way back to Bobbs-Merill, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that not only does the copyright creator have rights 
in the copies of intellectual property,106 but a purchaser of a copy of the intellectual 
property in question has an interest in selling the particular copy that he or she pur-
chased.107  The purchaser’s rights are not absolute and they do not override the 
creator’s right to reproduction, but they are rights worthy of being protected, and 
this is where the courts should step in.108 
The SoftMan approach conforms to the aforementioned Duck Test.109  Under 
                                                          
101 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing SoftMan and the Central District of California’s ap-
proach of examining the “economic realities of the exchange”). 
102 Even if software licensing provides for a right of repossession on the part of a publisher, this is 
a right that is rarely exercised.  At the time of this writing, not even an anecdotal story on a message 
board could be found illustrating a software publisher retaking a copy of software.  This speaks to the 
realities of the transaction as mentioned in SoftMan. See discussion supra Part II.B.  A licensed proper-
ty is usually repossessed at some point.  See discussion supra Part II.B.  The fact that there is no repos-
session tends to indicate that a sale has occurred.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
103 In this case, the economic realities of the exchange represent a sale due to the permanency of 
the exchange, and would likely be a sale under the SoftMan analysis.  See discussion supra Part II.B.  If 
return of the software was to be required, this would represent the economic realities of a rental or a 
lease, and would be considered as such under that same line of analysis.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
104 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the approaches of courts when dealing with modern 
software-related cases). 
105 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the approaches used in Vernor and SoftMan). 
106 The creator has the right to be the sole original distributor of that piece of intellectual property, 
among other rights.  See supra Part III.B (listing the rights provided under U.S. copyright law). 
107 The Supreme Court highlighted this interest in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–
51 (1908).  See Bobbs-Merrill Co., v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908) (discussing the Court’s ra-
tionale in creating the First Sale Doctrine). 
108 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the early policy rationale behind the First Sale Doc-
trine and the rights and interests sought to be protected on both sides of a transaction). 
109 See Davis, supra note 21. 
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the Softman line of analysis, if a transaction looks like a sale and quacks like a sale, 
it is a sale.110  A transaction is a sale if a consumer is granted unlimited rights to 
possess and access the software with no discontinuation of access in exchange for 
a one time lump sum, and if the consumer is granted the ability to utilize the soft-
ware as he or she wishes without making illegal copies in violation of the creator’s 
copyright, including reselling the software.111  Likewise, transactions where li-
mited access is granted for limited periods of time in exchange for incremental 
payments are considered licenses.  This analysis cuts both ways, but current trends 
indicate that this would end up being of the biggest benefit to consumers who may 
or may not be fully informed as to what their rights are under a transaction. 112  
Placing greater weight on the substance of the transaction will keep the consumer 
from getting into a deal that is not as it appears to be, and the approach will keep a 
consumer’s expectations of their rights in line with their observations from the way 
the transaction is carried out, as opposed to a licensing agreement that was never 
read and just clicked upon in “agreement.” 
A second compelling reason that courts should follow the SoftMan line of 
reasoning is that the Ninth Circuit’s Vernor decision could create a dangerous line 
of precedent where the “economic realities of the exchange” are not taken into ac-
count, and where a purported purchaser in a sale can have important rights stripped 
away merely by the designation of the transaction as something other than a 
sale.113  The SoftMan analysis keeps the substance of a transaction firmly grounded 
in reality rather than allowing reality to be defined by a meaningless label.114  As a 
result, SoftMan keeps the publishers and other retailers from stripping rights from 
consumers, and thus increasing profit margins for themselves.115  SoftMan pre-
vents bizarre results from happening when a transaction looks like a sale, but is la-
beled something else.116  Deceptive labeling could be the start down a slippery 
slope in intellectual property law—if software sales are being labeled as licenses 
today when they are substantially sales, it seems entirely possible that the same 
                                                          
110 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the SoftMan approach of examining the “economic 
realities of the transaction”). 
111 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
112 Consumers rarely read licensing agreements attached to software, and to prove this point PC 
Pitstop included a clause in one of its seven-page end user licensing agreements that offered cash to 
anyone who sent a note to the company.  Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License Agreements, PC 
PITSTOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).  After more than 
3,000 downloads, one user finally mailed a note to the company and received $1,000, as promised.  Id. 
113 This is in direct contrast with the court’s mandate in SoftMan.  See SoftMan Products Co. v. 
Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
114 The SoftMan approach gives very little weight to a label, in contrast to the ProCD Inc. approach 
and the Ninth Circuit’s Vernor analysis.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
115 See discussion supra Part II.B (comparing the SoftMan approach of comparing the economic 
realities of the exchange with the ProCD Inc. approach of relying on the text of the licensing agree-
ment); see discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the economic incentives of allocating rights to con-
sumers rather than publishers of software). 
116 Focusing on the economic realities of the exchange does just that, and prevents bizarre results in 
the presence of a licensing agreement that imposes restrictions on a transaction that otherwise resembles 
a sale.  See Softman, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.  This approach is also in the spirit of Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
where the Court ignored the presence of a licensing agreement in a transaction that was a sale in every 
other factual aspect.  See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908); discussion supra 
Part II.A (discussing Bobbs-Merrill Co.). 
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kind of labeling could take place with books, paintings, or any other form of intel-
lectual property in the future.  In software, deceptive labeling is very similar to the 
contract affixed to the inside cover of the book that was sold in Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
and therefore, this deceptive labeling does not comport with the mandates of the 
First Sale Doctrine as presented in that case.117  Courts should regard the sale of 
software with a licensing agreement just as the Supreme Court treated the book 
with the licensing agreement in Bobbs-Merrill, and the SoftMan approach is a 
modern way to reach a uniform result where different forms of intellectual proper-
ty are treated the same way regardless of media. 
On a larger scale, the debate about whether to follow the substance or the 
form of an agreement is a debate as to whether the consumer or the publisher 
should have the edge in a transaction.118  The publisher is often a multimillion-
dollar corporation capable of hiring a legal team competent for the task of formu-
lating favorable licensing agreements for the corporation.119  The publishers use 
this advantage to cut out rights of resale so that the publisher effectively controls 
the entire market for the product with the elimination of any kind of secondary re-
sale market.  On the other hand, consumers are typically just one person, or in 
some cases, small businesses.120  These kinds of consumers do not have anywhere 
near the level of resources that the publishers do, and do not have the day-to-day 
experience with the licensing agreements that the publishers craft.  In the interests 
of public policy and fairness, the consumers should be favored in software transac-
tions.121  The consumer is the more likely of the two actors in the transaction to be 
taken advantage of and to lose his or her rights due to a lack of understanding or 
resources.   
General contract law also mandates that the economic realities of a transac-
tion are followed.122  If a transaction that resembles a sale is not treated as such in 
a software context, there is nothing to stop other distributors of goods from charac-
terizing their transactions as licenses to strip rights from consumers.123  Imagine 
the instance of a homebuilder characterizing sales of new houses as a licensing 
agreement and preventing purchasers of these houses from reselling them, strip-
ping the right to realize any investment in the purchase from the buyer.  Any indi-
                                                          
117 See discussion supra Part II.A; Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350–51 (discussing the book 
involved in Bobbs-Merrill Co. and the Court’s treatment of the affixed contract). 
118 See discussion supra Part V (discussing the incentives of software publishers to implement 
measures that would allow or a digital First Sale Doctrine). 
119 Some of the most prominent software manufacturers on the market, such as Microsoft Corpora-
tion and Oracle Corporation, have gross profits in the billions of dollars and profit margins approaching 
ninety percent.  Chart: Software Companies: Gross Profit Margins, SEEKING ALPHA (May 7, 2006), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/10166-chart-software-companies-gross-profit-margins. 
120 Certainly, almost all of GameStop’s customers that purchase used video games are individuals 
seeking a leisure activity.  See Orland, supra note 98.  Sales of productivity-related software are more 
likely to be mixed between individuals and businesses. 
121 See discussion infra Part V.A (discussing the incentives on each side of a transaction involving 
software). 
122 See discussion supra Part III (discussing the judicial approach of analyzing the economic reali-
ties of a transaction). 
123 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the approach of strictly adhering to contractual 
agreements that was presented in ProCD).   
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vidual that desires to purchase a house in the style created by the builder would 
need to go straight to the builder, rather than, perhaps, buying an older version on 
the secondary market.  Such a result would be absurd and intolerable in the hous-
ing market, and the same should be the case in the software context.  Courts should 
level the playing field between consumers and publishers, and develop law that 
brings software sold through digital distribution under the umbrella of the First 
Sale Doctrine in the interest of sound public policy.  Under such a law, a consumer 
should be able to look at a transaction and be secure in knowing that he or she is 
receiving the same package of rights in a software transaction as in any other, and 
a right of resale should be protected in this process of securing consumer rights. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
If the First Sale Doctrine is implemented for digital distribution, active 
measures must be taken to ensure that the software can be transferred from one 
consumer to another on the secondary market.  Unlike more traditional forms of 
copyrighted media such as photographs, prints of paintings, compact disks contain-
ing music, or even software sold on compact disk or DVD, software sold via digi-
tal distribution is not manifested on a copy that is easily transferable.124  The sale 
of digitally distributed software is only practical if the sale is enabled by a device 
that allows for the transfer of the copy of software to the hard disk of the secondary 
market purchaser.  There are several ways that publishers could allow for this.125  
The first would entail a transfer from the hard disk of the first owner of the copy to 
the secondary market purchaser, whereupon the original copy of the software is 
deleted, leaving no trace.  A possible alternative is a transfer of a serial key from 
the first owner to the secondary market owner, resulting in the second purchaser 
having the ability to download the software from the digital distribution platform 
as the first owner did.  Finally, the ability could be provided to the first owner to 
place the software on a more transferable form of media—such as a compact disk 
or DVD—that would then allow for the sale of that copy. 
A.  The Piracy Problem 
Piracy is a significant problem lurking in the background of any proposed so-
lution.  The copy protection that is a part of almost all modern software is actually 
                                                          
124 It is true that the software becomes a copy as soon as it is downloaded and installed to the user’s 
hard disk; however, a copy on a hard disk cannot be parted with easily.  See Brian Mencher, Online 
Music Distribution: Proposal for A Digital First Sale Doctrine, 21 Ent. & Sports Law 16, 17 (2004).  
The modern hard disk is typically a storage medium that has many times the capacity of the software 
that is sold, and it is likely that the hard disk contains the personal documents and the other software 
owned by the consumer; therefore, a hard disk containing a copy of software sold via digital distribution 
cannot be sold easily as a hard copy.  Id at 18. 
125 Creative programmers are inventing unique solutions to open up secondary markets for digital 
distribution, particularly for electronically stored music.  See, e. g., Mike Masnick, Yet Another Compa-
ny Says It Can Help You Sell Used MP3s, TECHDIRT (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.techdirt. 
com/articles/20110218/12432213167/article_main.php?sid=20110218/12432213167 (discussing ReDi-
gi, a startup business focused on selling used MP3files); Eliot Van Buskirk, Byte This, HOUSTONPRESS 
(June 17, 2009), http://www.houstonpress.com/2009-06-18/music/byte-this/ (discussing Bopaboo, a 
platform focused on selling used MP3 files). 
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one of the devices that prevents digitally distributed software from being resold.126  
Digital distribution platforms almost always tie the ability to download software to 
an account of which that the user has control.127  Once the user purchases a copy of 
a program, the key for the software is added to the user’s account, granting the 
ability to download the program to the hard drive.128  The installation programs 
that are sold via digital distribution are also typically directly incorporated into the 
download process, making it impossible to arrange the file structure of a program 
in a way that would make it usable on a computer that the software was not direct-
ly downloaded onto.129  Software piracy is a significant problem, and the industry 
loses a significant amount of profits to software piracy every year.130  If measures 
such as these were not taken, it would be easy for any software owner to make 
copies of software and open up a piracy ring out of her home, either for profit or 
for the purpose of distributing the software to others free of charge.   
This rationale also works against the First Sale Doctrine with digitally distri-
buted software because copying the software is an essential step involved in trans-
ferring the software to a new owner.131  The same machinery that protects publish-
ers against piracy also hurts users who desire to sell their copy because the copy 
cannot easily be transferred to a different form of media that would facilitate a 
sale.132  A transfer would be prevented from occurring even if a more portable 
form of media is not used because the software used to guard the publisher from 
losses to criminal pirates is also harming the innocent consumer who wants more 
control over his or her software. 
There are three methods that could be implemented to facilitate the First Sale 
Doctrine in a way that would alleviate piracy concerns: (1) a forward and delete 
method, (2) free transfer of centralized licensing, and (3) the elimination of copy 
protection and implementation of other methods that would deter copying.  The 
problem that each of these solutions tackles is the copy that could potentially re-
main on the computer of the first owner of the software after “selling” the copy on 
the secondary market.  When a traditional hard copy of a piece of intellectual 
property is transferred, it literally “changes hands.”  The seller of a print of the 
                                                          
126 Copyright protection software is unable to distinguish between consumers that wish to use a 
copy of software on multiple computers and consumers that distribute copies of their software to far-
flung corners of the world for piracy purposes.  See Wardell Interview, supra note 77. 
127 See, e.g., About Impulse, supra note 71. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Kevin J. O’Brien, Silver Lining in Report on Software Piracy, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/technology/13iht-piracy.4.12855344.html.  The software industry 
lost $47.8 billion to piracy in 2007.  Id.  The industry suffered $8 billion worth of losses due to piracy in 
the United States during that year, the largest volume of losses to piracy in the world.  Id.  In contrast, 
the piracy rate—a country’s losses to piracy compared to volume of legitimate sales—was relatively 
low in the United States at twenty percent compared to rates of seventy-three percent and eighty-two 
percent in Russia and China, respectively.  Id.    
131 A copy of the software must be produced to transfer it to another computer.  Two copies of a 
legitimately purchased item of software will exist for at least a moment while the software is transferred 
to a new computer, or to another storage medium, even under a fast forward and delete scheme. 
132 Anti-piracy software makes free use of software difficult for legitimate purchasers who wish to 
use their copy of software on multiple machines.  Wardell Interview, supra note 77. 
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aforementioned Picasso work does not retain the print after sale.133  The print is 
transferred to the purchaser, who then assumes full control of that unique copy of 
the work, subject to the owner’s copyright privileges.  When a copy of software is 
transferred, the transaction is not so simple.  There is a significant possibility that a 
copy of the software will remain on the seller’s computer without any affirmative 
step taken by the seller.  Each of the aforementioned solutions attempts to elimi-
nate the problem of a copy being left behind, protecting the publisher from piracy 
caused by multiple illegitimate users of one copy, and protecting the legitimate us-
er from penalty. 
1.  Forward and Delete 
The forward and delete method is one of the more commonly cited solutions 
to the First Sale Doctrine with software.134  This approach takes direct aim at the 
copy that can remain on a seller’s computer directly after a sale by ensuring that no 
trace of the software is left on the first owner’s computer after the sale.135  Forward 
and delete requires a publisher to implement a program or protocol in its software 
that allows the software to be forwarded, either directly to another user via email, 
streaming transfer, or some other direct method; or by allowing the seller to place 
the program on a transferrable form of media, such as a compact disk or DVD.136  
As the name of the method implies, the “forward” action is immediately followed 
by a “delete” action that deletes the software from the seller’s computer, leaving no 
trace.137 The procedure would be completely automated, and does not leave open a 
possibility that a seller intent on retaining the software is unable to do so.138 
Because the method leaves no trace of the program on the seller’s computer, 
the publisher’s piracy concerns are alleviated.  Forward and delete insures that one 
legal copy does not multiply into additional illegal copies.  The drawback, howev-
er, is that this method is not without cost.  The coding that would need to be in-
cluded in the software to enable this approach would require several steps to be 
taken on the part of the publisher.139  Additionally, the forwarding function could 
require maintenance costs, especially if the forwarding process merely transfers a 
                                                          
133 Unless of course, affirmative steps are taken by the seller to illegally copy the print before the 
transfer. 
134 See, e.g., Mencher, supra note 124, at 16; Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copy-
righted Works: Adapting the First Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 Stan. 
Tech. L. Rev. 1, ¶43 (2002). 
135 Graham, supra note 134, at 43. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See id. 
139 Programming would need to be inserted into the software to facilitate both the forwarding and 
the deletion procedures. See Id. at 29 (describing different types of security measures that must be in-
serted into the coding of the protected software). This programming could bog down an already com-
plex piece of software, increase the amount of space the program inhabits on a user’s hard drive, or di-
vert the publisher’s resources away from working on substantial portions of the software. See Evan 
Narcisse, Download Site Says DRM Causes Piracy, TIME TECHLAND, (Apr. 12, 2011) 
http://techland.time.com/2011/04/12/download-site-says-drm-causes-piracy/ (“As it’s currently imple-
mented by the film, music and game industries, [digital rights management programming] has been 
known to slow down system performance.”). 
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key to the purchaser to allow for a download.140  This would create a scenario 
where the software would be downloaded at least twice, perhaps doubling the 
bandwidth usage of the publisher, and increasing the publisher’s costs for its dis-
tribution services.141  Despite these problems, however, the forward and delete me-
thod provides a way to facilitate the First Sale Doctrine that protects both users and 
publishers. 
2.  Serial Key Transfer 
When software is sold via a digital distribution platform, the ability to down-
load the software is tied to a serial key that becomes a part of the user’s account 
upon purchase.142  A serial key is a piece of data that becomes embedded in the 
computer, and identifies that computer to the digital distributor.143  It allows the 
purchaser of the key to download her copy of the software from the publisher’s 
server. Purchasing this key is what allows the owner of the software to download a 
copy onto her computer.144  The software cannot be downloaded otherwise, and it 
cannot be copied onto a computer that does not have the key.  Making these keys 
freely transferable would allow for the implementation of the First Sale Doctrine.  
A user could sell her key to a purchaser, rather than directly selling the software.  
Selling the key would terminate the seller’s ability to use the software and down-
load it in the future, and grant those rights to the purchaser.  Additionally, this me-
thod is fairly painless to the user, as methods have been created that eliminate all 
user interaction with digital rights management software, and integrate the licens-
ing mechanism directly into the background operations of the software.145 
The benefits to this approach are similar to the forward and delete method.  
Two or more usable copies of the software could not be created from one legal 
copy of the software.146  The difference is that the solution is at the server level 
rather than the software level, meaning that the publisher would not need to embed 
                                                          
140 Bandwidth is the amount of data that can be carried on an internet connection, and there is al-
most always a cost associated with this data transfer.  Bandwidth, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia. 
com/TERM/B/bandwidth.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).  Bandwidth usage on the part of the publish-
er might increase if software is resold, and thus, downloaded again.  This may be an irrelevant argument 
however, as more data may not necessarily be used.  Licenses do not typically allow a user to download 
the software only once, therefore, a legitimate user may download a copy of software multiple times. 
141 Increased bandwidth usage increases costs that the publisher must pay to its internet service 
provider for that bandwidth.  See How Much Does One Terabyte of Bandwidth Cost?, JOSEPH SCOTT 
(Jan. 22, 2009), http://josephscott.org/archives/2009/01/how-much-does-one-terabyte-of-bandwidth-
cost/ (survey of bandwidth prices). 
142 See, e.g., Impulse Support, supra note 84. 
143 The serial key can be a number or an account with an online service provider.  See id. The form 
is largely irrelevant; what matters is that the key grants only one user the ability to download and use 
the software per purchase.  
144 Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles ‘N Bits: Making A Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasible, 9 Mich. 
Telecomm. & Tech. L.  Rev. 1 (2002). 
145 See, e.g., About Impulse, supra note 71. 
146 Two copies would be created when the software is copied to the new host computer, but left 
behind on the first owner’s computer.  This is a problem that would be resolved by the deletion step of 
the forward and delete method.  This would ensure that only one version of a particular copy can exist 
at a time. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the forward and delete method).  
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measures directly into the software.147  This could be more or less costly than im-
plementing forward and delete measures, depending on the relative complexities of 
the software and the serial key scheme, but it is likely that implementing the ability 
to transfer keys would be less costly because the transfer process could be con-
ducted by the methods already in place that allow for the purchase of software.  
The drawback to allowing these transfers is similar to the primary drawback of 
forward and delete: allowing for the free transfer of serial keys is not a costless en-
deavor.148  The bandwidth costs would be even higher given that these downloads 
would be the only way to transfer the property, and this bandwidth may be signifi-
cant depending on the volume of business done digitally.149  However, like for-
ward and delete, this is a very effective way of preventing piracy while effectuat-
ing the First Sale Doctrine; therefore, it is an effective solution to implement. 
3.  Eliminating Copy Protection 
A final way to effectuate a transfer would be to eliminate copy protection al-
together, allowing for consumers to place their copy of the software onto physical 
media and transfer the copy to a new user manually, or to transfer to the new pur-
chaser by using a digital method.  Though this method seems radical given the sig-
nificant piracy problems that publishers deal with, several publishers, primarily 
publishers of computer games, have eliminated copy protection from their software 
altogether.150  Their reasoning is that modern software pirates are sophisticated 
enough to hack into whatever kind of copy protection that is devised to copy soft-
ware despite the protection.151  No copy protection, in their eyes, is just as effec-
tive as having the protection, so the protection is dropped.152  Additionally, users 
tend to prefer software that lacks copy protection for a variety of reasons—it al-
lows for multiple installations if the user owns several computers, it allows for re-
sale, and general freedom to do what one wishes with the software—therefore, 
some publishers have been led to believe that the practice of dropping copy protec-
tion increases sales due to the positive image created.153  The publisher would be 
seen as less restrictive by the consumers, and the consumers value this trust, per-
haps leading to increased respect for the company and increased sales.154 
                                                          
147 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the software coding required to implement the 
forward and delete method). 
148 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. (discussing the forward and delete method). 
149 See How Much Does One Terabyte of Bandwidth Cost?, supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
150 See, e.g., Marcus Yam, Game Developers Speaking Out Against DRM, TOM’S HARDWARE 
(May 13, 2009), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/pc-game-drm-copy-protection,7777.html (includ-
ing the input of several CEO’s of game development companies speaking against copy protection); 
Andrew Burnes, Brad Wardell Interview, VOODOO EXTREME VE3D (Apr. 18, 2009), 
http://ve3d.ign.com/ 
articles/news/46282/Brad-Wardell-Interview (focusing on Stardock’s copy protection-free approach). 
151 See Yam, supra note 150. 
152 Id.  
153 See id. 
154 Brad Wardell of Stardock believes that rewarding consumers for purchasing software, rather 
than punishing pirates and consumers alike, is a more productive was to ensure that users buy the soft-
ware rather than pirating it.  Alex Wawro, Analysis: Digital Rights Management in PC Gaming, 
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The primary benefit to using this method is that it is near costless and possi-
bly even cost reducing.  This approach does not require the implementation of any 
active device to facilitate a transfer of the software, making this approach imme-
diately less costly than forward and delete and free transfer of serial keys.  Modern 
copy protection and licensing systems are very complex, requiring development 
that can require the investment of significant resources, and even then these meas-
ures are not failsafe.155  Eliminating this cost could be a significant incentive to 
pursue this method of effectuating the First Sale Doctrine.  Despite the reduction in 
front-end costs, however, the method can be very costly because of the losses that 
could happen due to piracy, which would likely be more common given the lack of 
a barrier to piracy.  These competing costs would need to be weighed; if the gains 
from cutting the costs of implementing the copyright protection would outweigh 
the anticipated losses to piracy. If the cost of implementing the policy would out-
weigh possible losses to piracy, the measures would be worthwhile.  This approach 
would be appealing to companies that want to cut upfront costs that would be in-
volved in copy protection in enforcing one of the other methods. 
Other interests can come into play when analyzing whether copy protection 
should be eliminated.  The goodwill generated cannot be understated, as consum-
ers are likely to purchase software more frequently from publishers that they do 
not consider paternalistic.156  Additionally, there is a habit-building argument that 
resonates closely with piracy arguments made in the music industry—if people do 
end up pirating the software, perhaps they are more likely to build a habit of using 
the software, and will be more likely to purchase the software in the future and 
recommend it to friends.157  Furthermore, copy protection is almost always broken 
by pirates, regardless of how sophisticated it is and how much money a publisher 
put into it.158  Abandoning copy protection altogether is something that very few 
publishers have done, but it may be a sound choice in light of the rate of software 
piracy at the present, and in light of growing consumer disdain for paternalistic 
digital rights management software. 
B.  Which Method Provides the Optimal Outcome? 
Of the three methods presented above, the optimal choice depends on the 
company that is developing the software in question.  The choice represents the 
kind of private business decision that the government is unlikely to interfere with, 
therefore, it is improbable that a certain method would be preferred via legislation.  
                                                          
GAMEPRO (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.gamepro.com/article/news/214178/analysis-digital-rights-
management-in-pc-gaming/. 
155 See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1–2 (discussing the costs of implementing the forward and de-
lete and centralized licensing methods). 
156 See, e.g., Wardell Interview, supra note 77. 
157 Id.  Stardock’s Brad Wardell has, in at least one respect, admitted defeat in the war against pira-
cy.  Id.  He strongly believes that pirates would not have bought the software that they pirate a vast ma-
jority of the time regardless of any circumstances.  Id.  To him, copy protection is nothing more than a 
delaying mechanism, as all copy protection is broken through by pirates at some point, and the more 
complex it is, the more of a nuisance it is to lawful consumers of the software.  Id. 
158 Id. 
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The method of choice will depend upon the pre-existing practices and methods of 
the publishing corporation.  If a publisher has an extensive serial key system in 
place already, they are likely to choose to make these keys transferable if the cor-
poration wishes to implement the First Sale Doctrine.  The choice between forward 
and delete, centralized licensing, and proceeding without protection measures will 
depend upon the preferences of the company.  A publisher with more money that 
wants to protect its software as effectively as possible is more likely to implement 
forward and delete, while a smaller publisher that is looking to save money could 
just remove copy protection altogether.  It is up to the individual publisher to make 
the choice that is best for its own interest, and though this may be challenging, 
perhaps the greatest challenge is not a decision between these actions, but a deci-
sion to do anything at all. 
V.  PROBLEMS MOVING FORWARD 
Implementing a digital First Sale Doctrine may be easier said than done.  
There are numerous competing interests involved, including a battle between the 
interests of the end user and the interests of the publisher.159  Under the status quo 
situation, the publisher has the product, and therefore has the power.  Software 
companies are unlikely to want to implement measures that would reduce their 
share of the market by allowing for the existence of a secondary market for resale.  
The government, therefore, must step in to protect the rights of consumers and to 
ensure that software companies implement one of the above mechanisms that 
would allow for users to resell their software. 
A.  Paying to Sabotage Your Own Market? Why Content Providers Will Not 
Comply on Their Own 
The major problem in implementing the First Sale Doctrine is that publishers 
are unlikely to have an incentive to implement any of the above measures.  Both 
forward and delete and free alienation serial keys require up-front costs on the part 
of the publisher to implement them, while eliminating copy protection altogether 
bears an indirect cost, the potential to lose sales to increased piracy.  Additionally, 
these are costs that are expended to open up a secondary market for the product, 
which piles another indirect cost on the publisher.  Each sale made in the second-
ary market is a potential lost sale of the software that is available directly from the 
publisher.160  When viewed in this light, a publisher would be effectively paying to 
introduce a market that could undercut its prices and take sales away from the pri-
mary market.  This approach would effectively sabotage the market for the pub-
lisher’s products while the publisher makes expenditures to allow this to happen.  
                                                          
159 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the competing incentives involved in the First Sale 
Doctrine generally). 
160 Granted, this is an oversimplification; it does not take into account the likelihood that the sec-
ondary market copies will be available at a significant cost reduction from the primary market version 
of the software, and therefore, a number of people who would not buy the software at all at full price 
will purchase the good on the secondary market in addition to the consumers merely looking for a dis-
count. 
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When only pure economics are taken into account, publishers have almost no in-
centive to allow consumers to resell their software for a discount, to the detriment 
of the users that would want to sell the software and to the users who would want 
to purchase it. 
The only rationale that a publisher would have to implement these measures 
would be non-economic, and therefore, difficult to measure.161  A publisher could 
value the goodwill of customers, and could place a high level of importance on es-
tablishing trust in the marketplace.  These efforts in and of themselves are likely to 
yield economic benefits for the publisher, but they are difficult to measure through 
conventional means.  Most corporations have a preference for an economically op-
timal outcome, in the interest of expanding their profit margins.  Because of this 
economics-centric approach, it is unlikely that a vast majority of publishers would 
implement measures that would allow the First Sale Doctrine to exist in the digital 
setting.  This set of preferences necessitates the intervention of government and 
lawmakers if the rights of consumers are to be fully recognized. 
B.  Legislation: The Only Answer? 
Legislation could be the best way to effectuate the implementation of devices 
that would allow for a digital First Sale Doctrine.  At a highly abstract level, the 
First Sale Doctrine debate is a debate involving the allocation of rights.  Under the 
First Sale Doctrine, the right of consumers to freely alienate their copy of a given 
piece of intellectual property is recognized, while honoring restrictive licensing 
agreements elevates the rights of the corporation to control its product and prevent 
resale.  The Supreme Court made this policy decision long ago in Bobbs-Merill 
Co., Congress then codified the doctrine, and therefore, the consumers’ free right 
of alienation has been recognized as superior to the right of publishers to control 
the works they own.162  Congress has made the choice by codifying the First Sale 
Doctrine, and should follow up by recognizing these same rights in the realm of 
digital distribution.  How this is enacted could be left vague, leaving a choice as to 
how publishers could handle First Sale Doctrine implementation by choosing the 
method that best fits the company’s needs.163  The legislation would merely be a 
way to force action on the part of the publishers to implement the First Sale Doc-
trine measures that they are unlikely to implement on their own, leaving choice to 
the publishers.  This seems like a likely course of action, given the judiciary’s ten-
dency to favor the First Sale Doctrine, and the legislature’s recognition of the doc-
trine generally.164  It is likely only a matter of time before digital distribution is 
treated the same way as other methods of distribution that deliver goods that are 
substantially identical to digitally distributed goods.   
                                                          
161 Some publishers, such as Stardock, see fostering consumer goodwill as a critical aspect of their 
business model.  See Wardell Interview, supra note 77.  Wardell believes that balancing the protection 
needs of the software against consumer analysis is an important decision that a publisher must make.  
Id. 
162 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908). 
163 See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the differing considerations involved in choosing an 
implementation of the digital First Sale Doctrine). 
164 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the policy rationale for the First Sale Doctrine). 
56 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:I 
 
Software should be treated the same as paintings, books, and other intellec-
tual property that have traditionally been held to be included under the umbrella of 
First Sale Doctrine protections.165  Digital, web-centric transactions will become 
increasingly prominent as time passes, but it is not necessary that the law change to 
accommodate these developments.  Digital distribution should be considered a 
medium in and of itself, one protected by the same mechanisms as the more tradi-
tional media that the law was built upon.  Digital distribution cannot come to be 
symbolized by and likened to intellectual property without a manifestation for the 
purchaser to take ownership of.  Software sold through digital distributors is quite 
simply a Guernica print without the paper, and should be recognized as such.  The 
new electronic media should be embraced, not singled out and exempted from ex-
isting law. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Though the institution of the First Sale Doctrine in the context of digital dis-
tribution platforms will be costly to software publishers, these costs do not out-
weigh the detriment caused by the evisceration of property rights through licens-
ing.166  The sale of software through digital means produces the same product for 
the end user as does a sale over the counter involving a hard copy: a copy of the 
computer program in question.167  In an age where elaborate copy protection 
measures are a standard part of most consumer software, the use of different forms 
of media does not justify differing treatment between distribution methods based 
on outdated fears of widespread infringement.  The means exist to institute a digi-
tal First Sale Doctrine at a reasonable cost, and these measures should be pur-
sued.168  Legislation is an ideal way to force the publishers’ hands, causing them to 
take the necessary steps to secure the rights of consumers by applying the Duck 
Test to a digital First Sale Doctrine.169  Recognition of what the consumer is pur-
chasing, the data rather than its attached medium, like the art upon the paper rather 
than the paper itself, is the key to recognizing consumer rights in this evolving 
frontier of intellectual property law. 
 
                                                          
165 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the First Sale Doctrine generally). 
166 See discussion supra Part V.A (discussing the competing incentives involved in a digital First 
Sale Doctrine). 
167 See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the properties of software sold through digital distri-
bution platforms). 
168 See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing methods for the implementation of a digital First 
Sale Doctrine). 
169 See discussion supra Part V.B (discussing the use of legislation to implement a digital First Sale 
Doctrine). 
